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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. MILLETT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE ) 
STATE OF UTAH-BOARD OF REVIEW,) 
Defendant and Respondent.) 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
No. 16385 
THE DEFENDANT'S DENIAL WAS CAPRICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND UN-
REASONABLE as it did not require repayment of benefits received 
by reason of fraud as specified under Section 35-4-6(d) and 
assign the remaining overpayment under Section 35-4-6(e) as 
specified by statute. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT CONTEND THAT THE UTAH STATE SUPREME 
COURT HAS IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED THE INTENT OF THE UTAH STATE 
LEGISLATURE IN ITS ENACTMENT OF SECTION 35-4-5(e) UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953 AS AMENDED. Plaintiff does contend that the 
Court has not been asked prior to the instant case, to interpret 
the intent of the legislature in its enactment of Sections 
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35-4-6(d) and 35-4-6(e) as they relate to determinations made 
under Section 35-4-5(e) of the Act. 
Defendant suggests that Plaintiff states the period of 
disqualification for fraud should be less than the 52 weeks 
required by statute. Plaintiff states no such thing. PlaintiIT 
agrees that the claimant who commits a fraud invokes the full 
administrative penalty of fifty-two weeks disqualification. 
Defendant suggests that Plaintiff states that some monies 
received during such disqualification period should not be 
included in the attendant overpayment for that period. Plaintif 
states no such thing. Plaintiff does maintain that such bene-
fits as were not received by reason of fraud or fault can not 
be assessed under Section 35-4-6(d). Plaintiff states that 
benefits to which no material infraction attaches and which 
are later assessed in overpayment, must be assessed under 
Section 35-4-6(e). 
Defendant notes that the Employment Security Act makes no 
distinction between "simple" fraud and "compound" fraud. 
Plaintiff made these distinctions for the sake of definition 
on page 14 of his Brief, as the Defendnat noted. Defendant 
suggests that, because the Act makes no such distinction, the 
definitions are invalid. 
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Plaintiff states that the words of Section 35-4-5(e), 
"For the weeks with respect to which he had 
willfully made a false statement or repre-
sentation or knowingly failed to report a 
material fact to obtain any benefit under 
the provisions of this act ..• " 
mean that the claimant is disqualified for a 52 week period 
for every week with respect to which he perpetrated such fraud 
whether or not only one false statement was made. 
Plaintiff maintains the definitions are valid and that 
reasonable argument has not been made against them. 
Defendant states on page 10 of his brief that: 
"Plaintiff's interpretation of Section 5(e) 
would render a nullity of any penalty except 
in those cases where the fraud is discovered 
at its inception, for certainly the indiv-
idual who is required after the fact to repay 
only those monies obtained by reason of his 
fraud suffers no penalty whatsoever. Such 
would be the situation in the instant case 
were Plaintiff's interpretation of Sections 
35-4-5(e) and 35-4-6(d) to be adopted by this 
Court." 
Plaintiff's interpretation of Section 35-4-5(e) does no 
such thing. The penalty is not nullified and the Court is 
reminded that the period of disqualification in the instant 
case is still in effect at this v~ry moment. 
Defendant maintains on page 10 of his Brief that case 
number 65-BR-375 in which the Board of Review held that the 
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hearings representative lacked jurisdiction to correct an erron-
eously calculated overpayment, does not relate to the instant 
case. On the contrary, Plaintiff believes the decision cited 
shows that the Defendant and the Board of Review have acted 
capriciously in interpreting the Act in past cases. Plaintiff 
contends that the department had continuing jurisdiction in 
that matter as defined in Section 35-4-6(b) of the Act which 
limits review to one year except in cases of fraud or claimant 
fault. 
Plaintiff contends that benefits received to which no 
material infraction attaches can not be said to have been 
received by claimant fraud or fault. As such, that portion 
of overpayment to which no material infraction attaches must 
be assigned to Section 35-4-6(e), which Defendant quotes on 
page 6 of his Brief but with respect to which he made no further 
reference. 
Defendant has not addressed Plaintiff's argument that 
claimant A, whose gross payable on his claim was $3,600 and 
who obtained $1.00 by reason of fraud on his first compensable 
week receives the exact same penalty as claimant B who receivec 
$100.00 per week for 36 weeks by reason of fraud. Each claim-
ant is disqualified for a 52 week period and each is charged 
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$3600.00 in overpayment. 
Such an interpretation ignores the mandates of the over-
payment sections of the Act, specifically failing to apply 
Section 35-4-6(e) to those weeks of disqualification to which 
no material infraction attaches. 
In this way the determination does not conform to statute, 
and is clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. 
POINT III 
REFER TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
POINT IV 
REFER TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons cited above, Plaintiff requests the Court 
to reverse Defendant's findings that Plaintiff knowingly with-
held material facts of work and earnings, reverse Defendant's 
assessment of 52 week disqualification periods, and reverse 
Defendant's assessment of overpayments. 
For the reasons cited above, Plaintiff requests that the 
Court reverse the findings of the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission. Plaintiff further requests that the 
Court find that the Department of Employment Security and its 
Board of Review have improperly construed and misapplied 35-4-5 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(e), 35-4-6(d), and 35-4-6(e) and these statutes have not 
been properly applied and requests that the Court overturn 
the decision of the Board of Review. 
Plaintiff shows that the intent of the legislature and 
the rules of equity could be better applied and that there are 
alternate methods of collection that could be used by the 
Department of Employment Security. The Plaintiff requests 
that the Court overturn the decision of the Board of Review 
and instruct the Department of Employment Security to use the 
alternate methods available by statute. 
Plaintiff further requests that the Court find that the 
application of U.C.A. 35-4-5(e), in the instant case, violates 
petitioners rights under the Constitution of the United States 
and the State of Utah. 
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